


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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE

Intelligence Memorandum

Soviet Military Aid Diplomacy In The Third World


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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Directorate of Intelligence

September 1971

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

SOVIET MILITARY AID DIPLOMACY
IN THE THIRD WORLD

Introduction

1. For the past decade and a half, the Soviet Union has employed military aid as a primary instrument for expanding its influence in Third World countries. Although a relative newcomer to the international arms trade, the USSR has extended an estimated \$6.7 billion in arms aid to these countries since the mid-1950s. As the program has grown, Moscow has provided increasingly sophisticated weapons systems to many recipients. This, in turn, has required the employment in these countries of growing numbers of Soviet advisory personnel. Early in 1970, Moscow departed sharply from its role solely as a purveyor of arms and became a direct participant in Egypt's conflict with Israel. This memorandum analyzes the characteristics of the Soviet arms aid program and assesses its effectiveness in relation to Soviet objectives in the Third World.

Discussion

Origin and Motivations of the Soviet Arms Aid Program

2. The radical change in Soviet policy toward the less developed countries (LDCs) that followed Stalin's death in 1953 placed emphasis on extending Soviet influence through the overt channels of bilateral state relations. In contrast to the traditional Soviet policy of fostering militant local Communist parties, the post-Stalin leadership moved to cultivate good relations with the legitimate governments of these countries. This tactical shift presumably reflected Moscow's assessment that the most effective strategy for establishing and expanding its influence and for eroding that of the West in Third World countries lay in associating itself with the strong nationalist and anti-Western sentiment in many of these states. The Soviet

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leadership thus gave priority to gaining entree in the LDCs by establishing diplomatic relations with them and by offering political and material support for their national objectives. Simultaneously, local Communist organizations subservient to Moscow's directives were restrained from overt revolutionary activity that would offend these countries.

3. The leaders of many Third World countries, motivated by their own political and economic aspirations, were receptive to the post-Stalin changes in Moscow's policies and generally were prepared to accept Soviet foreign assistance. This receptivity was enhanced by the unwillingness of many LDCs to associate their newly won independence with the foreign policy objectives of the West. The USSR needed only to present itself as an additional source of political, economic, and military support to find a number of willing recipients.

4. In this milieu, foreign aid immediately became an important foreign policy tool for expanding Soviet influence in Third World countries. The USSR has extended more than \$14.5 billion in military and economic aid to these countries since 1954, of which about 45% (\$6.7 billion) has consisted of military assistance. Moscow has used the two programs either jointly or separately to pursue its objectives in recipient countries.

5. Military aid generally has been an effective Soviet instrument for establishing a position of influence in the Third World, usually providing an immediate and lasting impact on the recipient country. By providing such assistance, Moscow became an advocate of a recipient's national aspirations, able to exploit this position to the detriment of Western interests. Arab-Israeli tensions, Yemen's conflict with the United Kingdom over Aden, Pakistan's disputes with Afghanistan and India, and Indonesia's territorial conflicts are examples of opportunities initially exploited by the Soviet Union. The LDCs generally have sought Soviet arms for use against their neighbors and only occasionally, as in Ceylon in 1971, have they procured Soviet weapons primarily to maintain internal security.

6. In addition to the broader objective of undermining Western influence in recipient countries, Moscow has used its military aid program in an effort to weaken Western strategic interests and to eliminate Western military bases and alliances adjacent to Soviet borders. The USSR has sought as a minimum to neutralize the Baghdad Pact (now CENTO) and SEATO and thus disrupt the West's "northern tier" of defenses against the USSR. Moscow provided arms (as well as economic aid) to Afghanistan to ensure that Kabul remained neutral and well-disposed toward the USSR. Soviet aid to India was intended to diminish India's reliance on the West and to extend the Soviet presence into the subcontinent.

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7. Soviet arms aid to Southeast Asian countries was designed to strengthen Soviet influence at the expense not only of Western but also of Chinese Communist interests. This was true of aid to Indonesia, the Pathet Lao, and, to some extent, the Viet Cong.

Magnitude and Character of the Program**Pattern and Distribution of Soviet Arms Aid**

8. The Soviet Union launched its military program in 1955 — initially using Czechoslovakia as an intermediary — when it began arms shipments to Egypt. Since then, the USSR alone has extended some \$6.7 billion in military aid to 29 countries of the Third World (see Table 1).⁽¹⁾ The UAR and Indonesia account for nearly 50% of total extensions. Six other countries — India, Iraq, Syria, Algeria, Iran, and Afghanistan — have received most of the rest. By mid-1971, an estimated 85% of Soviet military aid commitments had been delivered. Drawings in the late 1960s averaged about \$400 million annually, then reached a record high of over \$900 million in 1970 as Moscow completed massive deliveries of SAM equipment to Egypt.

9. Because the Soviet program is in part a response to available opportunities, and is influenced by the absorptive capacity of the recipients, the annual magnitude and direction of aid has been highly variable (see the chart). During 1956-58, agreements were largely with Middle Eastern countries. A decline in new agreements during 1959 was followed by two years of sizable commitments, principally to Indonesia, as that country's dispute with the Netherlands intensified. Agreements concluded during 1962-64 were influenced by Sino-Indian tensions, civil war in Yemen, and Indonesia's confrontation with Malaysia. Most of the commitments since 1966 reflect the continuing arms buildup in the Arab countries in the wake of the 1967 war with Israel and new extensions to India and Iran.

10. Another important factor influencing the level of new military aid extensions has been the replacement of obsolete equipment. The most obvious examples have been the periodic replacement of the various generations of fighter aircraft (MIG-15s and 17s with 19s and 21s), procurement of the TU-16 jet medium bomber and SU-7 fighter bomber after initial purchases of the IL-28 light bomber, and more widespread use of the T-54/55 medium tanks, compared with the earlier model T-34 tanks. Such cycles will continue as an important feature in the Soviet program, not only because recipient countries continually clamor for more advanced arms, but also because, as each generation of weapons becomes obsolete

1. *Detailed tables on the Soviet military aid program are included in the Appendix.*

SECRET**Table 1**

**Soviet Military Aid Extended
to Less Developed Countries
1956 - June 1971**


	<u>Million US \$</u>	<u>Percent of Total</u>
<i>Total</i>	6,690	100
United Arab Republic	2,135	32
Indonesia	1,092	16
India	768	11
Iraq	722	11
Syria	527	8
Algeria	395	6
Iran	310	5
Afghanistan	280	4
Libya	113	2
Yemen	77	1
Sudan	66	1
Somalia	45	1
<i>Others a/</i>	160	2

a. Including Burma, Burundi, Cambodia, Ceylon, Congo (B), Cyprus, Equatorial Guinea, Ghana, Guinea, Maldives, Mali, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Southern Yemen, Tanzania, and Uganda.

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Soviet Military Aid to Less Developed Countries



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for Soviet requirements, the USSR discontinues its manufacture. In time, replacement parts become scarce and a country that has a large and varied inventory of Soviet arms usually has to accept more advanced equipment coming off Soviet production lines if it is to maintain an up-to-date military capability.

11. Perhaps the most significant development in the Soviet military aid program in recent years has been its concentration. In contrast to Khrushchev's almost indiscriminate extensions to all takers, the post-Khrushchev regime has tended to place emphasis on the countries comprising an arc running from the eastern Mediterranean, through the Red Sea, to the Arabian Sea. In this arc are countries which either control the strategic Suez waterway, contain the bulk of the Free World's oil reserves, or are adjacent to the southern borders of the USSR. These countries account for about 90% of total Soviet military aid and practically all of the aid committed in recent years.

Equipment (See the photographs)


12. At least two-thirds of the equipment provided under Soviet military aid agreements is of types that still are in standard use in the Soviet armed forces. Perhaps half of that equipment is still in current production in the USSR. These proportions should rise as more advanced weapon systems are exported.

13. Egypt, moreover, has been provided air defense and other equipment on a par with the best that is provided the regular Soviet forces. In 1970, besides being the first non-Communist state to receive the new SA-3 missile system, as well as improved SA-2 missile equipment, Cairo received, for the first time, the FROG-7 short range tactical rocket, the Strela handcarried air defense missile, and the ZSU-23-4 self-propelled radar-controlled antiaircraft gun. In 1971, the mobile SA-6 missile system and late model Foxbat interceptors were introduced into the country, although remaining under Soviet control. In an effort to tighten up the Egyptian air defense system, the Soviets also have brought into Egypt some of their latest electronic command and control equipment. Most noteworthy of this gear are the SWAMP and MARKHAM systems which integrate airborne interceptors, air defense command centers, radar sites, and antiaircraft gun and missile positions.


14. Soviet military equipment exported to the LDCs is usually unused and in good condition, although much of it is classified as used because it comes from stocks rather than current production. What problems do arise with Soviet equipment usually occur after the recipients receive it. During the early years of the program, mistakes occurred frequently - for example, Arctic gear was sent to the Middle East or weapons were sent

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
T-55 MEDIUM TANK




SA-3 (GOA) MISSILE

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FREE ROCKET OVER GROUND (FROG)




SA-6 (GAINFUL) MISSILE

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23-MM SELF-PROPELLED ANTIAIRCRAFT GUN ZSU-23-4

without spare parts - but as the program has matured such problems have been largely eliminated. Spare parts remain the major problem. The Soviets seek to provide spares in the original agreement adequate for anticipated maintenance over a specified period. The insistent demand by recipients for additional spare parts probably is attributable to deficient storage and accounting procedures and abuse of equipment.

Terms of Aid

15. Moscow generally sells its arms at comparatively low prices and on favorable terms. Repayment usually is made over ten years, after a grace period of one to three years, at 2% interest. Moreover, the USSR generally accepts payment in commodities or local currency and frequently has reduced or postponed payment when the recipient was unable to meet an annual payment.

16. Discounts from list prices have become an intrinsic feature of Soviet arms aid to Third World countries, averaging perhaps 40% of the value of Soviet arms deliveries. Even without the discounts, the list prices of most types of Soviet arms have been substantially below those charged for comparable Western equipment.⁽²⁾ Although discounting probably is premised on Moscow's assessment of a recipient's ability to pay, political favoritism also is seen in the variations evident in Soviet practice. Afghanistan, for example, has received discounts approximating 75%.

2. Soviet prices, for example, range 40% lower for a medium tank to roughly 50% lower for an advanced fighter aircraft.

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Discounts to Indonesia averaged about 25%, while arms aid to India has been conducted largely on a no-discount basis.

The Role of the East European Countries

17. The military aid programs of the East European countries have been most modest and are likely to remain so. Of the \$800 million in East European arms extended to the LDCs, nearly 60% was provided during 1955-58 when they were acting primarily as intermediaries for the USSR. East European arms commitments subsequently dropped sharply and since 1964 have averaged some \$50 million annually. The major East European suppliers have been Czechoslovakia and Poland and the primary recipients have been Moscow's major clients - the Arab countries, India, and Indonesia. Their credit terms have been more stringent than those offered by the USSR; they have insisted on shorter repayment periods and payment in hard currency, and have given no discount from list prices.

Military Technical Assistance

18. The rapid influx of large quantities of modern military equipment poses serious problems for the recipients because most of them are short of trained manpower and skilled technicians. Consequently, the USSR has had to provide complementary programs of technical assistance embracing two activities: the training in the USSR of military personnel from LDCs and the sending of military technicians and advisers to countries receiving military aid. The cumulative cost of such assistance to all recipients since 1956 is estimated to be at least \$600 million -- adding another 10% or so to the arms aid program. Most of this expense has been paid on current account, as only \$40 million is known to be covered by long-term credits.

Trainees

19. Some 26,000 military trainees from LDCs, largely middle-grade officers, have gone to the USSR for training. About 85% of the trainees have been from Afghanistan, India, Indonesia, and the Arab countries. Trainees generally are brought to the USSR before delivery of the weapons and equipment on which they are to be trained. These training programs range from six weeks to five years, with most of the trainees engaged in programs lasting less than a year. The longer programs generally include training at Soviet higher military schools, such as the Frunze Military Academy of the General Staff.

Advisers

20. Beginning with some 350 Soviet military advisers in the LDCs in 1956, the number has grown steadily and since 1961 has averaged over

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4,500 annually. Nearly 10,000 Soviet military advisory personnel were present in recipient countries in mid-1971. Although some of these personnel serve as technicians to deliver, assemble, and service equipment, their most important functions are to train local personnel in the operation, maintenance, and tactical use of equipment. For the larger aid recipients, courses generally are established in the use of the entire range of armaments received. Soviet officers also serve as instructors in the major military academies of these countries. In their advisory capacities, Soviet military officers have played key roles in modernizing and reorganizing the military establishment of the major recipients.

The Egyptian Aberration

21. Moscow's technical assistance to the UAR after the June 1967 War differed substantially from its standard programs in the rate of implementation and in the extent of Soviet commitment. This program has come to resemble the program in Cuba in 1962 and shows that Moscow is prepared to accept considerable risks in Third World countries where the stakes are high enough. Along with the rapid replacement of equipment lost in 1967 came large numbers of Soviet technicians to assemble the equipment and to train Egyptians in its use. These technicians and advisers penetrated the UAR's military establishment to a depth not previously experienced in other recipients in an effort to correct operational deficiencies exposed by the June conflict.

22. Perhaps even more critical was the eventual direct assignment of Soviet forces to man air defense units in the UAR. As a result of Israeli air raids deep into Egyptian territory, Nasser prevailed upon the USSR in January 1970 to provide the UAR with the SA-3 SAM system, then deployed only in the USSR and Eastern Europe. By late spring, at least 15 SA-3 firing battalions had been installed near Cairo and Alexandria. An estimated 4,000 Soviet military personnel quickly arrived in the UAR to man these firing units and to provide the necessary ancillary support. By mid-1971, an estimated 10,000 Soviet military personnel — exclusive of about 6,000 advisers — were in the country

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23. Although Egyptian personnel continue to train on the SA-3 system, it will be some time before they can operate the equipment effectively on their own. Some Egyptian SA-3 crews may be close to completing their training or may already be in an operational status. Even as Egyptian crews achieve operational status, however, large numbers of Soviet personnel will be required for some time if the system is to operate at anywhere near its designed maximum level of effectiveness.

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Results of the Program

Soviet Objectives Served

24. As Moscow assesses the returns from 16 years of military aid, it must conclude that the program has served Soviet objectives well. Although the USSR has acquired no ideological converts from its foreign aid, it has gained considerable influence and leverage. Soviet support for nationalist governments has contributed substantially to the weakening, or elimination, of Western influence in many countries and has led to an expansion of Soviet presence into such areas as the Middle East, South Asia, and North Africa. Moreover, through the procurement of Soviet arms, a number of states — notably Afghanistan, Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Somalia, and Syria — now are largely or almost totally equipped with Soviet military equipment and are continually dependent on the USSR for logistical and technical support.

25. Through its military technical assistance — in conjunction with economic technical assistance and academic training — the Soviet Union has exposed many of the nationals of these countries to socialist ideas and techniques — an exposure which Moscow hopes will influence the institutional development taking place in the Third World. Moreover, it has established important relationships with military leaders, as well as junior officers, who in the future may hold key positions in their countries. Countries which obtain most of their arms from the Soviet Union have difficulty balancing Soviet military technical assistance with similar Western programs because of the sharply reduced contacts with Western organizations, techniques, and methods.

26. Moscow undoubtedly has experienced its greatest success among some of the Arab countries. For 16 years the Soviet leadership has taken advantage of the Arab-Israeli conflict almost to the point of driving out nearly all Western political influence among its major Arab clients. Cairo's two defeats by Israel in 1956 and 1967 permitted Moscow to expand its presence and achieve its greatest degree of influence in the UAR. The USSR has strengthened its naval presence in the Mediterranean considerably by virtue of arms aid to the Arab states. Although some Arab recipients occasionally criticize Moscow's foreign policies, they have, in effect, retreated from their professed policies of nonalignment and tend to cooperate with the USSR on many international issues. For example, there was almost no criticism of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia from the major Arab arms recipients.

27. Arms aid also has produced considerable influence for Moscow in South Asia. By serving as the principal arms supplier to Afghanistan in the past 15 years, the USSR has helped to ensure that country's friendly

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neutrality. Soviet arms aid to India has increased Moscow's influence in that country and circumscribed that of the West and recently helped to place the USSR on the Indian side in that country's dispute with Pakistan.⁽³⁾ As Soviet military aid to India expands, receptivity to Soviet requests -- such as for maritime facilities -- is likely to increase.

The Question of Base Rights

28. Moscow has not used its aid program to acquire formal base rights, but it has sought and obtained a variety of operating privileges which, in some cases, give Soviet overseas military activities all the support they currently require. The Soviets have helped their clients develop ports and air bases which can be used by Soviet forces on a limited basis and which might even be run in part by Soviet personnel. The USSR, for example, has acquired the use of Egyptian facilities at Port Said, Alexandria, and Mersa Matruh, and to a lesser extent at Latakia in Syria to support its Mediterranean fleet operations.

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Moscow's Influence: How Durable?

29. While arms aid has undoubtedly increased Moscow's influence and leverage in many LDCs, it has not enabled the Soviets to control these countries' domestic and foreign policies. Realizing this, the Soviet Union has been careful not to abuse the influence it has gained, and only rarely has it tried to use it to exact political concessions.⁽⁴⁾

30. There are many examples of the limited nature of Soviet influence. Despite large amounts of aid, Syria and Iraq condemned the

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4. In at least one instance, Moscow has tried to exercise leverage through arms aid. After the overthrow of the Kassem regime in Iraq in February 1963, the new Iraqi government attacked the international Communist movement, violently repressed the local Communist Party, and stepped up military operations against the Kurds. In retaliation, the USSR first slowed the pace of its military deliveries to Iraq and then stopped deliveries altogether. This stoppage of deliveries resulted in a sizable diminution in Iraqi operations against the Kurds. The Iraqis subsequently ceased their anti-Communist propaganda campaign and reduced their repression of local Communists, and the USSR agreed to resume normal military aid shipments.

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ostensible Soviet-Egyptian acceptance of US peace initiatives following the August 1970 ceasefire. Algeria tends to stay aloof from too-close Soviet ties, and Libya does not hide its suspicions of Soviet intentions in the Middle East. Nor have prominent Arab Communists or Marxists been commensurately aided by the increased Soviet presence. Moscow's leading supporters in the UAR recently were purged and Soviet-Sudanese relations seriously weakened as a result of the decimation of the Sudanese Communist Party in the wake of the unsuccessful left-wing coup. Particularly distressing to the Soviet leadership has been the inability of regimes which they viewed with favor -- such as Kassem, Ben Bella, Keita, and Nkrumah -- to remain in power, in spite of sizable amounts of Soviet aid.

31. Perhaps the Soviet Union's most outstanding failure has been its effort in Indonesia. Moscow lost practically all its investments after the abortive 1965 coup attempt in that country. Not only has the bulk of Soviet equipment become unserviceable (some of it has been sold for scrap), but Moscow has received very little repayment on the huge Indonesian arms debt.

Conflicting Commitments

32. Moscow also has discovered that the expansion of its military assistance program has been tempered by some common problems which accompany a large-scale military aid undertaking. The USSR occasionally has found itself with conflicting commitments which have complicated its bilateral relations and limited its options. Soviet military aid to Somalia, for example, has made it difficult for Moscow to further its policies in Ethiopia and Kenya. Moscow's assistance to the Kassem regime in October 1958 added an important irritant to those already existent in Soviet-Egyptian relations at the time and triggered the first polemical exchange between Nasser and Khrushchev. Moscow's support of Indonesia prevented friendly relations developing with Malaysia.

33. The primary example of this dilemma in recent years has been the Soviet effort to tread a tightrope between India and Pakistan. Pakistan, which until 1965 had been exclusively supplied with Western military equipment, subsequently turned to Communist China for most of its recent arms acquisitions. The Soviet failure to undercut the growing Chinese Communist influence through the supply of military equipment under a 1968 arms agreement and growing adverse reaction to the agreement in New Delhi led to a suspension of arms deliveries to Islamabad in 1969. Moscow, however, continued to seek closer relations with Islamabad and even extended nearly \$210 million in economic aid to Pakistan early in 1971. The Soviet-Indian Friendship Treaty signed in August 1971 indicates that Moscow has clearly chosen India's side in the conflict and probably precludes -- at least for the short term -- any resumption of Soviet arms aid to Pakistan.

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34. Moscow also has viewed with some concern the prospect of Soviet arms recipients using their weapons for aims not always consonant with Soviet interests. There is no evidence to suggest the USSR has prompted any major recipient to engage in hostile acts. Soviet leaders, however, obviously are aware that their equipment is being acquired for potential use against "hostile" neighbors, and the possession of sizable amounts of arms encourages some countries to engage in political and military activity that they otherwise might have not undertaken. In spite of its large military aid program in Indonesia, for example, Moscow was unable to dissuade Sukarno from his policy of "confrontation" with Malaysia or to prevent him from pursuing policies favorable to the Chinese Communists.

Financial Burden for the Recipients

35. Moscow's willingness to provide arms aid to eager recipients has led the latter to divert scarce resources from economic development and thus has contributed to internal economic dislocation and financial distress. Despite the favorable terms on which Moscow usually sells arms, most recipients have experienced difficulty in meeting their scheduled debt payments. Only about one-fourth of the estimated \$3.2 billion arms debt — the value of aid received less discounts — had been repaid by the end of 1970. Among the major recipients, the UAR, Syria, and Indonesia have repaid only about 22%, 17%, and 10%, respectively, of their debts. Indonesia alone accounts for about one-third of the total outstanding Soviet arms indebtedness.

36. Difficulties in debt service have led to frequent requests by recipients to reschedule debt payments. Although rescheduling does little more for the USSR than maintain influence already gained, it prefers rescheduling to the irritation likely to result from default. Moscow has

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most likely expects eventually to write off a substantial portion of the unpaid arms debt of its primary recipients.

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SECRETGrowing Cost to the USSR

37. Initially, Moscow was able to keep the cost of military assistance low by delivering mainly obsolete equipment made available by its own modernization program. Thus, in the 1950s and early 1960s, most Soviet military aid was drawn from existing — although often unused — stocks of military materiel. As these stocks were depleted and the demand from recipient countries for more sophisticated weapons rose, the USSR eventually was compelled to shift more to the export of currently operational equipment. Some types of equipment delivered to LDCs — for example, the ZSU-23-4 antiaircraft gun, the Mirka-class minesweeper, and the Vydra-class landing craft — have not even been provided to other Warsaw Pact countries.

38. The costs of the Soviet arms program has continued to mount as Moscow has sought to satisfy more of the demands for late-model equipment. The assortment of advanced conventional weapons already provided to some clients probably will be made available to other recipients, and a few newer types of equipment — for example, T-62 tanks — probably will soon enter the inventories of the larger recipients. The process of replacing the obsolescent equipment of existing clients is a gradual one, and the countries that seem to be the most likely new clients of the USSR over the next year or two are, for the most part, relatively small.

Outlook for the Program

39. The USSR will continue to use its military aid program as a primary foreign policy instrument for expanding its influence in the Third World. Such aid has a more immediate impact and creates a greater degree of political dependence than other forms of assistance. Most military aid in the future probably will go to the countries which have been the principal recipients in the past and consequently have developed a dependence on Soviet arms and political support. The USSR constantly will have to upgrade the weapons in its aid program to replace obsolete equipment and to meet competition. Such modernization will ensure a continued requirement for Soviet technical assistance. Beyond these basic trends, the magnitude of Soviet military aid will depend on unpredictable events, such as regional hostilities, and other opportunities.

40. In any event, most Soviet arms aid will continue to go to the Arab countries — where Soviet prestige is greatly involved, Western interests are being eroded, and the political cost of "letting down" the recipients would be large. Afghanistan and India also will continue to receive large amounts of aid in order to maintain the large investments made and influence achieved. The uncertainties of domestic and regional politics in Africa probably will turn up new prospects over the next several years.

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Zambia, for example, in its growing frustration over the Rhodesian problem, may provide Moscow with an opportunity to compete effectively with the West as well as the Chinese.

41. Although the USSR is not actively promoting its military wares in Latin America, there are unsettling changes taking place which in time may offer new opportunities for the Soviet Union. Largely because of US restrictions on arms exports, many Latin American countries already have shifted much of their arms procurement to West European sources in order to modernize their military forces. Some countries, with Chile the most notable example, have installed leftist governments which have indicated a willingness to expand relations with the Communist countries. These developments reflect growing dissatisfaction with US military assistance to the area and could increase Latin American receptivity to Soviet military aid blandishments.

Conclusions

42. Since the mid-1950s, the USSR has extended an estimated \$6.7 billion in military aid to 29 less developed countries. The UAR and Indonesia together account for nearly 50% of total extensions, while six other countries -- India, Iraq, Syria, Algeria, Iran, and Afghanistan -- have received most of the rest. Besides providing a great variety of weaponry to its client states, the USSR has trained some 26,000 foreign military personnel within its own schools and has stationed thousands of advisers and technicians in the recipient countries at an estimated cost to the recipients of at least \$600 million.

43. Moscow has charged relatively low prices for its arms and has made generous repayment arrangements with its arms clients. Repayment periods have run around ten years at an interest rate of 2%. The USSR also has provided discounts averaging about 40% from the list price value of equipment. General economic difficulties, however, have forced some recipients to seek an easing of terms and a rescheduling of payments. By the end of 1970 the less developed countries had repaid only about one-fourth of their estimated \$3.2 billion arms debt.

44. In contrast to the USSR's economic aid program, Soviet military assistance has been characterized by rapid delivery, immediate impact, and a development of rapport with key military leaders in the nonaligned countries. The Soviet leadership consequently considers arms aid as a valuable and effective instrument of policy. It has been used to build positions of influence at the expense of the West, sometimes to undercut the Chinese, and to improve opportunities for access by Soviet forces to ports, airfields, and other facilities.

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45. In pursuing its objectives, the USSR has encountered both success and failure. Partly as a consequence of these Soviet military aid programs, Western influence has been eroded in many countries, and Moscow has become the dominant foreign influence in several important areas, notably the Middle East. Military aid has not, however, provided Moscow with strong or dependable control over client states or improved the fortunes of local Communist parties.

46. From the Soviet point of view, the outlook for arms aid is encouraging. The major objective of the program — the replacing of Western with Soviet presence and influence — apparently is being met for the most part. Conflict and instability in the Third World during the years ahead will probably provide Moscow with additional opportunities to dispense military aid. From the recipients' point of view, the outlook for the program is also favorable. In most instances, their armed forces have shifted from Western to Soviet equipment and have graduated from simple to more complex armament. The USSR has generally been willing to underwrite larger programs for its recipients than the United States, and Soviet terms for military equipment have consistently been more attractive than those of Western suppliers. The recipient countries will continue to seek arms and technical support, especially if the USSR remains circumspect in using the military aid program for political leverage.

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APPENDIX

Statistical Tables

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Table 2

Soviet Military Aid Extensions to the Less Developed Countries

Recipient	Total	Million US \$																	
		1956	1957	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	Jan-Jun 1971		
Total	6,690	117	238	281	30	558	828	416	387	801	257	371	584	395	264	562	103		
Afghanistan	280	75	--	--	25	1	--	--	--	125	--	10	44	--	--	--	--	--	
Algeria	395	--	--	--	--	--	--	3	107	--	135	--	50	--	--	--	--	100	
Burma	N.A.	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	N.A.	
Burundi	Negl.	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	Negl.	
Cambodia	12	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	1	3	--	2	--	--	--	--	--	--	
Ceylon	2	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	2	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	2
Congo (B)	14	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	
Cyprus	26	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	26	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	9	
Equatorial Guinea	Negl.	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	
Ghana	10	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	6	--	3	1	--	--	--	--	--	--	
Guinea	11	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	8	--	2	2	--	--	--	--	--	--	1
India	768	--	--	--	--	--	13	2	74	53	209	80	149	--	38	150	--	--	
Indonesia	1,092	--	8	--	5	283	441	95	61	199	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	
Iran	310	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	150	--	10	150	--	
Iraq	722	--	--	131	--	98	113	--	--	41	--	181	80	6	45	25	--	N.A.	
Libya	113	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	113	--	
Maldives Islands	Negl.	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	
Mali	4	--	--	--	--	--	--	2	--	--	--	2	--	--	--	--	--	--	
Morocco	13	--	--	--	--	--	--	3	--	8	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	
Nigeria	9	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	
Pakistan	20	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	30	--	--	--	
Somalia	45	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	35	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	10	
Southern Yemen	17	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	5	
Sudan	66	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	66	--	--	--	
Syria	527	42	75	90	--	--	--	60	--	35	--	25	125	75	--	--	--	N.A.	
Tanzania	2	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	2	--	--	--	--	--	--	
Uganda	10	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	10	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	
United Arab Republic	2,135	--	155	60	--	150	270	150	100	250	25	--	175	100	50	650	N.A. a/		
Yemen	77	--	--	--	--	--	--	20	30	10	--	10	--	5	2	--	--	--	

a. The value of the 1971 Soviet commitment to the UAR remains undetermined but is certainly substantial -- that is, over \$200 million.

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Table 3
Soviet Military Aid Drawings by the Less Developed Countries

Recipient	Total	Million US \$															
		1956	1957	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	Jan-Jun 1971
Total	5,753	15	136	195	95	216	322	.786	577	284	321	442	408	366	336	912	342
Afghanistan	275	5	38	20	16	2	--	1	20	3	35	30	25	30	30	20	--
Algeria	261	--	--	--	--	--	--	3	7	60	30	85	40	15	1	20	--
Burma	N.A.	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Burundi	N.A.	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Cambodia	10	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	1	1	--	2	--	4	2	--	--
Ceylon	2	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	2
Congo (B)	4	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	1	--	--	1	--	--	2
Cyprus	18	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	18	--	--	--	--	--	--
Equatorial Guinea	Negl.	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Ghana	10	--	--	--	--	--	--	3	3	2	2	--	--	--	--	--	--
Guinea	11	--	--	--	--	3	--	1	--	1	2	2	--	--	--	--	1
India	619	--	--	--	--	--	15	4	54	2	60	165	50	90	84	50	45
Indonesia	858	--	8	--	5	17	55	448	185	90	50	--	--	--	--	--	--
Iran	100	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	15	20	30	25	10
Iraq	545	--	--	--	14	26	60	114	96	10	25	28	47	50	30	25	20
Libya	45	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	30	15
Maldives Islands	Negl.	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Mali	4	--	--	--	--	--	2	--	--	--	2	--	--	--	--	--	--
Morocco	13	--	--	--	--	3	--	7	1	--	--	1	1	--	--	--	--
Nigeria	9	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	6	3	--	--	--
Pakistan	8	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	8	--	--	--
Somalia	40	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	15	10	4	--	2	3	6	--
Southern Yemen	12	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	2	4	4	2	--
Sudan	60	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	5	15	40	--	--
Syria	518	10	40	90	30	15	15	35	35	15	5	15	48	35	35	50	45
Tanzania	2	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	1	1	--	--	--	--	--
Uganda	7	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	1	5	--	1	--	--	--
United Arab Republic	2,245	--	50	85	30	150	175	150	150	75	80	100	170	100	90	640	200
Yemen	77	--	--	--	--	--	--	20	25	10	2	2	10	5	1	2	--

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Table | 4

Soviet Military Technicians
in Less Developed Countries a/
1969 and June 1971

<u>Country</u>	<u>June 1971</u>	<u>Persons</u> <u>1969</u>
<i>Total</i>	<i>9,670</i>	<i>6,745</i>
Afghanistan	160	200
Algeria	1,000	1,200
Cambodia	--	30
Congo (B)	15	15
Ethiopia	--	5
Guinea	65	65
India	300	455
Indonesia	--	30
Iran	30	15
Iraq	320	320
Mali	30	105
Morocco	20	20
Nigeria	50	130
Pakistan	10	10
Somalia	250	180
Southern Yemen	120	100
Sudan	400	200
Syria	750	500
Tanzania	5	35
Uganda	45	30
United Arab Republic	6,000 b/	3,000
Yemen	100	100

a. Minimum estimates of the number of persons present for a period of one month or more. Numbers are rounded to the nearest five. Figures also include a small number of Eastern European technicians.

b. Does not include Soviet military personnel assigned to Soviet operational units in the United Arab Republic.

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Table 5
Major Soviet Military Equipment Delivered, by Recipient a/

Type of Equipment	Afghan- istan	Al- geria	Cam- eroon	Ceylon	Congo (B)	Cyprus	Equa- torial Guinea	Ghana	Guinea	India	Indo- nesia	Iran	Iraq	Libya	Mali	Units
Land armaments																
Heavy tanks	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Medium tanks	436	357	--	--	--	32	--	--	20	550	--	--	758	130	12	
Light tanks (amphibious)	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	11	176	155	--	--	--	--	
Self-propelled assault guns	48	100	--	--	--	--	--	10	5	--	--	--	150	24	--	
Personnel carriers, armored and amphibious	300	500	21	--	19	32	--	24	29	119	400	600	1,100	283	100	
Artillery pieces b/	1,750	950	221	--	25	32	--	30	79	463	550	575	1,422	104	80	
Naval ships																
Light cruiser	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	1	--	--	--	--	
Destroyers	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	16	--	--	--	--	
Submarines	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	4	12	--	--	--	
Minesweepers	--	2	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	6	--	2	--	--	
Submarine chasers and escort vessels	--	6	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	5	16	--	3	--	--	
Motor torpedo and missile boats	--	21	--	--	--	6	--	--	2	8	26	--	12	--	--	
Other, including auxiliary vessels and landing craft	--	3	3	--	13	--	--	4	9	8	57	--	7	--	--	
Aircraft																
Medium jet bombers	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	26	--	10	--	--	
Light jet bombers	35	32	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	28	--	15	--	--	
Jet fighters	190	128	14	5	--	--	--	--	4	150 c/	112	--	236	--	3	
Heavy transports	1	7	--	--	--	--	--	--	40	6	--	--	13	--	--	
Other, including non-jet combat aircraft, trainers, transports, and helicopters	96	68	15	3	5	--	1	5	23	167	258	--	185	--	18	
Guided missile systems d/																
Air-to-surface e/	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	12	--	--	--	--	
Air-to-air f/	42	22	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	50	26	--	96	--	--	
Surface-to-air g/	1	h/	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	17	8	--	1/	--	--	
Surface-to-surface j/	--	9	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	8	12	--	--	--	--	
Antitank k/	24	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	28/	--	--	

Table 5
Major Soviet Military Equipment Delivered, by Recipient a/
(Continued)

Type of Equipment	Morocco	Nigeria	Pakistan	Somalia	Southern Yemen	Sudan	Syria	Tanzania	Uganda	UAR	Yemen	Units
Land armaments												
Heavy tanks	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	60	--	
Medium tanks	122	--	550	155	42	102	985	25	--	2,310	135	
Light tanks (amphibious)	--	--	--	--	--	--	33	14	--	87	--	
Self-propelled assault guns	30	--	--	--	--	--	140	--	--	250	65	
Personnel carriers, armored and amphibious	80	3	--	244	6	172	600	40	36	1,700	155	
Artillery pieces b/	100	90	350	441	55	100	1,255	80	36	2,550	460	
Naval ships												
Light cruisers	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	
Destroyers	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	6 1/2	--	
Submarines	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	18 1/2	--	
Minesweepers	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	13	--	
Submarine chasers and escort vessels	--	--	--	--	--	--	2	--	--	12	--	
Motor torpedo and missile boats	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	56	2	
Other, including auxiliary vessels and landing craft	--	3	--	8	--	--	--	20	--	27	3	
Aircraft												
Medium jet bombers	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	50	--	
Light jet bombers	--	--	12	--	--	--	6	--	--	76	8	
Jet fighters	12	33	108	25	10	24	326	--	5	895	18	
Heavy transports	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	28	--	
Other, including non-jet combat aircraft, trainers, transports, and helicopters	5	13	14	3	5	16	183	1	15	535	55	
Guided missile systems d/												
Air-to-surface e/	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	6	--	
Air-to-air f/	--	--	--	3	--	24	133	--	--	324	--	
Surface-to-air g/	--	--	--	--	--	1	10	--	--	134	--	
Surface-to-surface h/	--	--	--	--	--	--	4	--	--	23	--	
Antitank k/	--	--	--	--	--	--	30	--	--	100	--	

- a. This table represents total deliveries, including some East European and Chinese Communist equipment, and does not reflect attrition or current inventory. Neither does the table indicate deliveries of equipment to Soviet forces in Egypt.
- b. Including recoilless cannons and mortars over 100 mm in size. The figure for the UAR also includes the delivery of six PROC rocket launchers.
- c. Excluding those MIG-21 fighters assembled at the aircraft assembly plant at Nisik.
- d. Data reflect numbers of aircrafts, ships, and vehicles having missile capability.
- e. Indicating number of TU-16 aircraft equipped with ASM (two per aircraft).
- f. Indicating number of fighter aircraft equipped with AAM (two to four per aircraft).
- g. Indicating number of SAM firing battalions (sites) -- six launchers per SA-3 site, four launchers per SA-2 site.
- h. Algeria has received an undetermined number of SAMs, and now may have an operational capability.
- i. Equipment for SAM firing battalion originally delivered to Iraq has been resold to the UAR.
- j. Indicating number of Komar- and sea-class boats equipped with SSM (two to four per vessel) and three coastal defense missile sites in the UAR.
- k. Indicating number of vehicles used as launchers (three missiles per vehicle).
- l. Including two old destroyers and five old submarines returned to the USSR in exchange for newer models.